Apartheid victims have had a difficult standing in South Africa in the years that have followed the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). In the government's perspective, the TRC had conclusively dealt with apartheid victimhood. Consequently, when victims turned to U.S.
3 is still pending, Ms Nala is looking for new members for Khulumani with whom to share the legacy of experiences of harm and to see Khulumani grow. Becoming a Khulumani member is equated with becoming a plaintiff in the lawsuit and hence a potential beneficiary if the case gets settled or damages are being paid out. Ms Nala, a very active member, identifies potential members to the best of her knowledge -which is embedded in a very local context. In the wider Cape Town area, some of the most important structural violations took place in the 1970s and 1980s when thousands of informal residents lost their belongings and often several family members during raids by the police and their undercover helpers from the communities, the 'witdoeks'. Ms Nala's notion of who a victim is relates to her own experiences during that time.
In other words, while the TRC was thought to end claims to victimhood, the pending apartheid litigations keep alive an environment in which it matters whether one is acknowledged as a victim or not. This could be the reading by scholars who are critical of processes of 'legalization' (Blichner and Molander 2008) . Current legal anthropology in particular is concerned with processes of legalization, that is the discursive reduction of subjectivities of those who turn to the courts with their social concerns (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006; .
Turning to the law, they argue, does not solve the social problems from which legal cases emerge. On the contrary, legal cases may help create legalized subjectivities and thereby again subject people to externally produced discourses (Comaroff and Comaroff 2003; 2006; Robins 2009; Van Marle 2008) .
I believe that, in this discussion, the discursive dimension of the "force of the law" (Bourdieu 1986 ) has been overemphasized. This has made it difficult to discuss the effects of legal discourse onto the social domain: too strong a focus on discourses alone conceals the societal underpinnings that give the law the ground to be effective. Bringing social practice back in, I
suggest a refinement of the theory of legalization by paying close attention not only to discursive formation but also lived experience in a particular context. Every norm needs to encounter societal realities in order to become effective in shaping sociability (Popitz 2006 ).
Norms such as legal norms may help producing their own certainties, but they do not have agency by themselves (cf. Bourdieu 1986) .
One consequence of processes of legalization has been very prominently criticised in scholarly writing: the tendency of the law to break up a collective. As Jean and John Comaroff write, various rights discourses, including human rights, advocate a language of individual rights (2003:466) and thereby promote an "idiom that individuates the citizen " (2003:457) . The law produces shifts in how people relate their individual personhood to a collective; it jeopardises their solidarity with and similarity to others. I will show that this tension between the individual and the collective is not only a feature of the law but also of post-apartheid South Africa in relation to enduring apartheid injuries. The relation between victimhood and the law is shaped by the fact that structural injuries have both an individual and a collective dimension.
Conceptually, I speak of victimhood as a state of being of a victim of human rights violations.
This state is self-ascribed and a genuinely intimate and personal experience. Victimhood is often not expressed in a discursive form. Once a person takes his or her victimhood into the predicative realm, I speak of victim subjectivity. Subjectivity is necessarily discursively formed and it is in a relation to other predicated forms of victimhood. Victim subjectivities thus refer to what I call victims' subject positions. These are discourses -often dominant, such as the law -which give ideas and ideals of what a victim is or is supposed to be. These three different positions are empirically not clear-cut. Moreover, they are not exclusive: a person's self is "the location of multiple and potentially contradictory subjectivities, each established within discourses and discursive practices" (Merry 2003, 349) .
Read along this conceptual framework, my argument is as follows. The lived experience of victimhood gives the law (a dominant discourse) the opportunity to become effective; it shapes people's being-in-the-world and their positions vis-à-vis others. It is hence not the law that produces legal subjectivities. As I will show, apartheid victimhood as an ongoing lived experience today has not been addressed sufficiently for people not to claim their victimhood when the opportunity arises. In the process of engaging their victimhood with discourses, though, the forms of sociality they live change.
Using a hearing of the apartheid litigations before the Southern District Court of New York, the first part of the article analyses how a court grapples with notions of collectivity and individuality. In the second part of the article, I show how the notions of collectivity and individuality negotiated in court are effective in the social domain by looking at one testimony by a plaintiff on an ordinary afternoon in South Africa. In the final part, I make a more general argument on the efficacy of the law. I highlight the kinds of including and excluding practices during the time legal cases are pending before courts, i.e. when the law is 'inactive'. While much attention is given to the outcome of prominent court actions, I try to think through what fairness may be for plaintiffs in relation to pending legal cases.
For this analysis of law and its societal effects (Goodale and Merry Mr. Hoffmann: In particular, the one plaintiff that we have with respect to Barclays suffered gross discrimination and was forced to work, could not work in certain places that were considered to be white areas and was forced to go to Bantustans and to work outside of that. That is the nub of that particular claim. We also named that Barclays did worse things to the work force as a whole, but that is what the particular plaintiff There is another instance in which the plaintiffs were granted recognition as actors. One of the defendants' attorneys, Mr. Greenwald, referred to a principle of limitation, the time bar: "Just to state the obvious, this case concerns events that occurred 15, 20, 30 years ago" (p.86: 5-6).
He argued that the cases had not been brought within ten years after the end of apartheid and had therefore been filed too late.
There is a distinct difference between when Mandela was elected and when apartheid ended. Indeed, it was so distinct that in 1991, the first President Bush lifted the sanctions As the apartheid litigations were first filed in 2002, the defendants argued that they were not filed within ten years after what was, according to their reading of history, the end of apartheid.
This claim provoked the Judge to ponder about plaintiffs' lived realities in the early 1990s. In her response, she very explicitly talked about the life-worlds of the plaintiffs:
The fact that our [US] government became comfortable enough to lift restrictions doesn't tell me what it was like to be a black person living in South Africa in 1991 who was contemplating suing some South African companies or subsidiaries of national companies that do business in South Africa claiming that they were collaborating in the apartheid system when the control was still in the hands of the very white politicians who had enforced the system. So there is a disconnect here between our government lifting a restriction on certain things and what it would have been like to be a plaintiff.
(p.89: 4-14)
The Judge refused to assume correlation between a foreign policy move by the then U.S.
administration and the lived reality of black South Africans between Mandela's release and the first democratic elections. For the attorney, this was a "highly questionable historical assumption" (p.89: 18) and he reverted to his second trump card. He insisted that the concept of "equitable tolling" nonetheless applied. In other words, the Judge summarized for him, "what did they do for eight years". Even if it fell within the ten years, there was only so much time plaintiffs should need to file a suit. This left the Judge pensive:
Can I begin to explore when is the timing for when they could have brought the action, whether it's '90 or '94, would that not take some discovery. Because I really don't know what it was to be a claimant in South Africa during those four years. (p.93: 24 -p.94:
3)
The attorney insisted, 'we have eight years of doing nothing. More if you go by our reading of the history ' (p.94: 13-14) . Mr. Hausfeld, attorney in the Khulumani case, was later asked to take a stance on "why is '94 the trigger date?" (The Court; p.101: 4). He replied that that year was the "first practical time when South African had its own government not associated with apartheid" (p.101: 5-6). In the early 1990s, everything was still instituted by a white South but the general procedure does not allow for it nor are attorneys particularly prepared to deliver such information.
How is it like to be a claimant in South Africa?
The massive attention for apartheid-era victimhood during the working of the TRC was core, which needs to be addressed somehow. Hence, it is not only the law that grapples with the relation between collective and individual injuries, but also victims themselves.
Against this background, plaintiffs see class actions as a way to avoid personalizing harm which they feel they suffered collectively. Class actions offer the opportunity to make structural violations actionable. Not each injury to every harmed person has to be alleged in separate cases; the class comprises those harmed in similar ways by the same agents. Class actions can thus point to a social and political context in which plaintiffs want to strengthen similarities among themselves and present their injuries in a united manner. The whole notion of a class then rests on the idea of shared injustices -much more than just similar injustices.
The apartheid litigations, as long as they are pending, accommodate different kinds of victims and experiences -not because the U.S. law is so flexible, but because for the first 13 years, no class of victims has been certified, and nobody has explicitly been included or excluded. It is in this context that the effects of class actions on the social realm are interesting to examine.
Does the (attempt of) individualisation of harm (as fleshed out in the court hearing above) become socially relevant as legalization theory suggests? Do plaintiffs expose themselves to processes that break apart their practiced solidarity by turning to the courts seeking recognition for the generalized nature of apartheid-era violations?
Trapped Between Victimhood and its Articulation
To answer these questions, I turn to a situation where a Khulumani member testified to her injuries in a more or less ordinary social setting in Philippi Township, Western Cape, South
Africa. I show how she, who has fallen victim to crimes just as thousands of others, seemed to feel the necessity to give evidence to her individual victimhood by singling out herself. Given the fluctuant attention politics gives to victims' concern, social situations in which victims can attempt to speak from their embodied knowledge and "try on" (Merry 2003 ) their political victim status are rare, and they come with uncertainty whether or not they will be heard or Before I left her house, she looked for an old piece of paper and showed it to me: "You see, I
have communities, the so-called 'witdoeks', and the community members whose leaders were organised in gangs, women and children were often not singled out as targets of violence, but became targets nonetheless (Cole 1987) . The loss of lives, belongings and housing were often part of a broader strategy to frighten communities and demonstrate power. This collective dimension of injuries and testifying to it relates to the ways people testified in front of the TRC.
While the TRC had invited only specific individual testimonies, the tension between testifying to an individual and collective element of crime existed in the TRC process, too. While persons had to prove their individual victimhood, they testified to a more broader context, tooprecisely because this broader context was not examined by the TRC (Bonner and Nieftagodien 2003; Derrida 2002; Harries 2010) . As a result, victims came to testify with a double subjectivity: as individual victims and as part of a more structural group of victims.
While the 'us-dimension' was highly present in Ms Kotta's testimony, she also singles herself out when she refers to specific instances. These are experiences of pain she has to cope with herself and experiences which do not necessarily socialize. By the same token, they are also instances that she can claim as specific violations that happened against her person. Part of this individual dimension of victim subjectivity was the instance when Ms Kotta produced some evidence which she might not include in an everyday account: a piece of paper with ID numbers of two persons who she said eye-witnessed the death of her son. This is both a kind of a written record and the referral to the words of others that should serve as objective external testimony to the violations. She produced this evidence in a non-legal setting, but in a situation which she thought of as conducive for her grief and claims be heard. I came to represent a person who wanted evidence even if I never asked her to talk about her experiences; something I deliberately avoided out of both delicacy and fear of re-traumatisation. Evidence, of course, is one of the major aspects of what constitutes legal claim making. Being able to produce evidence should convey the status of a victim in the realm of the law. Of course, Ms. Kotta's prime interest was not to conform to a legalized discourse, but to relate her experiences in a manner legible to me, who did not share her experiences. In order to do so, she had to differentiate between the us-dimension of generalized suffering and her specific experiences: experiences that she could claim as wrongs committed against her own person.
In other words, in order to be legible as a victim, she felt she had to differentiate her own experiences from those of the others. This is a striking analogy to the law's logic in relation to class actions. While principally, the law allows classes to allege collective injuries, it nonetheless has to grasp victimhood on the individual level in order to prove the causal link between perpetrator-action-victim. In this social situation at-hand, it was not first-hand experience with the law that produced the individual victim subjectivity. Ms Kotta's evidentiary-based testimony has been produced in a specific activist political environment that has turned the law into an important point of reference to prove one 's victimhood (cf. Colvin 2004) . In such an environment, situations of contact are not neutral, and legal and political discourses influence the assumptions people have about listeners' expectations.
It is in this light that I read Ms Kotta's testimony: she referred to the legal logic and, by necessity, had to individualize her victimhood from others'. The moment of shared memories of suffering produced new sociability between her and her listeners, but simultaneously, the need to articulate her individual victim subjectivity resulted in an individualized subjectivity. It is the legal logic played out in a highly mediated political and societal environment that resulted in a (momentous) legalization of her personhood. With Bourdieu's term (1986) , the "force of law" can only become effective under specific political and social conditions. Even if the law is inactive, i.e. when cases are simply pending before one or the other court, social processes that are related to the legal claim-making nonetheless happen. They happen because specific social and political conditions are conducive for the legal logic to take effect.
What is fairer, individual or collective justice?
The law individualizes injuries for pragmatic reasons and for reasons of tradition. It has always tried to causally connect an act of harm to an agent and to a victim; and it struggles to do the same for more structural violations where these causalities are not as clear-cut. As argued above, defendant companies in class litigations often argue for the individualization of harm as one way of contesting commonality among class members. They claim "the right to present rebuttal evidence […] with respect to every member of the class" (Lahav 2010, 119) . For obvious reasons, it is too time-consuming to hold individual hearings for thousands of potential class members. Such an argument would not only demonstrate the unmanageability of the case and quicken its dismissal. Furthermore, if individual harm could not be proven for every member of the class, the class itself would appear as a misguided generalization.
However, individualization is not only a strategy to have cases dismissed, it also speaks to a notion of supposed fairness for plaintiffs. Indeed, in relation to mass tort cases, legal scholars increasingly advocate the procedure of 'sampling' where samples of cases are tried and the resulting damages are then applied to the remaining class members (Lahav 2010; Saks and Blanck 1992) . As a compromise for both defendants and plaintiffs, Alexandra Lahav, a legal scholar, suggests to consider the variation among class members. She suggests that courts hold a series of "informational bellwether hearings" (2010, 123) by selecting a random sample of plaintiffs and hold hearings in each of the sample cases. This statistical adjudication would reveal whether the defendant would be capable of introducing credible rebuttal evidence in relation to each of the individuals. The court could then extrapolate the result of the sample hearings to the entire class (2010, 123ff.) . Crucially, for Lahav, this would also solve what she sees as a general fairness problem for the plaintiffs in a class action: some injuries are more severe than others but conventionally all the plaintiffs receive the same pro rata amount.
Working with sampling, however, the strongest cases would receive the highest awards. As she writes: "similarly situated plaintiffs will in fact be treated equally" (2010, 124) . Determining the variation among class members should thus be advantageous not only for the courts to get a grasp on the class but also for the plaintiffs who are generally discriminated against as a result of lumping their situations together by way of consolidation. 10
For Lahav, the consolidation into a class is an unfortunate procedural move which, at least, allows us to address injustice on a grand scale. Her prime focus is on the outcome of a case, on the amount of damage, payback or relief the individual class member receives. Her approach is pragmatic and victim-centered, but it does not resolve the fundamental tension between individuality and collectivity. Sampling (which heavily draws on quantitative social sciences methodology, cf. Walker and Monahan 2002) simply replicates a system of individualization.
It is important to see the premise of such suggestions. It presumes that personalized justice is, per se, fairer. This might seem self-evident to lawyers, but it may not be the view of victims.
For victims, class actions emerge out of a concern for something they share and which they want to make actionable as a group rather than as individuals. Often, individuals are happy to step back and be submerged into a class; also many victims are too weak to step up for their individual cause. Finally, filing a case requires considerable legal knowledge and connections to engage with the world of law, neither of which structurally disadvantaged individuals necessarily have. The class thus stands for something shared and the leading role is often deliberately and voluntarily delegated to a lawyer or to some victims particularly equipped to represent the similarly situated others.
This means that in the context of the plaintiffs, 'fairness' cannot be understood in terms of the monetary outcome of a case exclusively (leaving aside the fact that the majority of human rights class actions are either dismissed or settled out of court anyway, cf. Nagareda 2008) but we need to see it in its relation to lived socialities among people who share experiences.
Furthermore, one has to consider that class actions are often pending in courts for a decade or longer, and are often accompanied by civil society activities such as self-help or advocacy groups and fierce contestations by their own or other foreign governments. Court cases can also be the context within which plaintiffs create new forms of socialities among themselves and develop political subjectivities (Kesselring 2012b ). In such situations, measuring injuries along a statistical logic likely further threatens a collective notion of victimhood.
I do not suggest that during the years when court cases are pending, the tension between individual and collective victimhood does not play out; quite the contrary. For one, people have to stick up for their recognition in a political environment that works like a spotlight and offers attention on and off. The inattention for the injuries victims experienced means that they feel the necessity to force attention through whichever avenue they can get. Scarry 1985) which is difficult to share discursively (Kesselring 2012b ) and which continuously disrupts one's life. Notably, in both instances (political environment and embodiment of experiences of harm), it is not the law that produces individualization of victimhood. Instead, the law offers a discursive form to articulate the individual dimension of victimhood, which goes back to the nature of apartheid crimes.
Conclusion: Politics' Inattention and the Law's Inactivity
In conclusion, I come back to the vignette with Ms Nala at the outset of the article and the question of who is a real victim and who is not. We may read these including and excluding practices as legalization. Indeed, the creation of 'the individual victim' out of a collective is one consequence of what the Comaroffs identify as a 'culture of legality'. This reading ascribes agency to the law and argues on a largely discursive level. The view that the law "has the capacity […] to carve concrete realities out of fragile fictions" (Comaroff and Comaroff 2003, 457) does not take into account that the law needs to encounter certain 'pre-existing structures', that is underlying societal issues, in order to be effective as a discourse (Bourdieu 1986 ).
I tried to show that that legal subjectivities do not emerge from 'fictions' but from lived experience of injustice. In other words, what is being experienced as injustice and has remained unaddressed for too long will necessarily become an issue -notwithstanding the trigger that offers a form of articulation. If victims feel the necessity to individualize their victimhood in particular moments (of despair or for political reasons), the law offers a discursive form for this individualization. As long as the courts have not resolved the procedural questions, the law leaves the mechanisms of identifying class member to victims themselves. Any South Africa is potentially a plaintiff and, necessarily, processes of inclusion and exclusion are taking place.
These practices, however, are not anchored in the law's tendency to individualize or legalize victimhood. They are anchored in the inattention of politics in matters apartheid victimhood and in the inactivity of the law.
The ways a social class of victims practice their solidarity during the years the case is pending in court and the ways they handle the real threat to that solidarity defines the possibilities for emancipation from victimhood in the long run. As emancipation from victimhood is a social process, a class ought to remain intact for it to be a possibility. The law is a means and a reference in that struggle -and not the key determinant for lived forms of sociality.
